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INTRODUCTION 
Margaret Jane Radin’s paper3 discusses the ways modern technologies have 
prompted new thinking within and about property, and the way the legal response 
has failed to take sufficiently into account the countervailing considerations that have 
shaped earlier Property Law developments.  Some new technologies have also 
caused intellectual and practical struggles within Contract Law.  This paper will 
consider some of the developments of Contract Law related to these changes, in 
particular the transactions relating to the sale, leasing or free use of computer 
software and the purchase of computers. 
Part I of this paper introduces the topic and offers an overview of how American 
Contract Law has responded to the issues raised.  Part II then looks at the distinctly 
different approach of the European Union. 
                                                                
1Director, Shidler Center for Law Commerce & Technology & Professor of Law, 
University of Washington. 
2Frederick W. Thomas Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Minnesota. 
3Margaret Jane Radin, A Comment on Information Propertization and Its Legal Milieu, 54 
CLEV. ST. L. REV. 23 (2006).  
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I. THE U.S. LEGAL RESPONSE 
The focus of this Article is the interrelated set of issues that have arisen, on one 
hand, from Internet transactions regarding the downloading of free or purchased 
software, as well as other Internet sales, and, on the other hand, the distinctive 
transactional problems that modern business practices have created under the rubric 
of “shrink-wrap” or “terms in the box”—a late presentation of terms associated with 
the sale of computers or the licensing of software (with the terms included in the 
packaging, rather than presented to the user ahead of time)—but not necessarily 
confined to those transactions.   
Such transactions raise novel questions, in part because they frequently involve 
the sale of “new property,” and in part because they involve novel ways of 
contracting, even when the subjects of the contracts are conventional goods and 
services.  At the same time, these transactions can be seen as primarily offering a 
new twist on a now-standard theme:  the problem of unread terms in standard-form 
contracts.  As Clayton Gillette wrote: “Consumers who deal with clickwrap, 
shrinkwrap, or browsewrap contracts are likely to ignore terms provided only on or 
within product containers, online at the time the goods are ordered, or in containers 
that arrive with the goods subsequent to the time when the goods are ordered.”4 
This raises a basic unifying theme of these sorts of transactions:  there is 
something unusual within Contract Law  (though by no means unprecedented) 
regarding the way terms are presented and agreements are formed in these 
transactions.  That is the focus of the next section. 
A. Novel Presentation of Terms 
There is at best a quite rough analogy between what is occurring with electronic 
contracting and the process of  “propertization” discussed by Prof. Radin.5  The 
regulation of electronic contracting is primarily a matter of using existing Contract 
Law rule—directly, or with some extension.6  Direct application may be clearest in 
                                                                
4Clayton P. Gillette, Pre-Approved Contracts for Internet Commerce, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 
975, 975-76 (2005) (footnote omitted).  Gillette continues:   
Failure to read terms may be predicated on rational judgments about low defect rates 
or the low likelihood of either finding oppressive, enforceable terms or being able to 
negotiate around them.  These tendencies to disregard terms, however, may be 
exacerbated by cognitive errors, other forms of bounded rationality, or informational 
lapses that cause even reading buyers to misperceive the risks attending the goods they 
purchase or to apply improper discount rates to the risks they bear and thus to 
miscalculate the effects of unfavorable terms. 
Id. at 976. 
5See Radin, supra note 3. 
6On the topic of how Contract Law has been modified to deal with electronic contracting, 
along with the doctrines and principles discussed below, one might also note the 
extension/adaptation (by both courts and legislatures) of writing requirements to accept e-mail 
and other electronic signatures.  See, e.g., Electronic Signatures in Global and National 
Commerce Act (E-Sign Act), 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 7001-7031 (West Supp. 2005); UNIF. ELEC. 
TRANSACTIONS ACT (UETA) §§ 1-21 (1999), available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc 
/fnact99/1990s/ueta99.htm; see also Int’l Casings v. Premium, 358 F. Supp. 2d 863, 873 
(W.D. Mo. 2005) (under UETA, adopted by Missouri, electronic signature suffices for written 
signature requirement of Statute of Frauds). 
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cases of “clickwrap,” a form of transaction common for on-line purchases and the 
on-line downloading of (free or paid) software.  With “clickwrap” the transaction 
will not go forward unless and until the consumer clicks a button indicating “I agree” 
(or similar terms of express assent) after the statement of terms and conditions.  
Under such circumstances, one can easily find “offer” and “acceptance” (and terms 
fully presented prior to acceptance) just as in conventional contracts. 
Even “shrink-wrap contracts”7—where terms are sent in the box with the 
computer or software or other object purchased or licensed, and the purchasers or 
users are deemed to have assented to the terms if they do not object and return the 
object in a timely manner8—have some analogues in existing Contract Law and 
practice.  Insurance contracts may be the best and most salient analogy of such 
“rolling contracts” (where terms are added or clarified even after the initial 
agreement of the parties).  In these contracts, one obtains insurance by coming to an 
agreement on the general terms of the policy (type of coverage, extent of coverage, 
deductibles, premiums, etc.), and often only after that (initial or tentative) agreement 
are all the terms of the policy sent to the insured.  One might also point to the 
analogy of tickets to concerts or sporting events, where one frequently learns of 
disclaimers and limitations of liability by the seller only once one has received the 
tickets (with the disclaimers and limitations often printed on the tickets themselves).9   
One should not underestimate the problems that can arise even with the relatively 
familiar-looking “click-wrap” transactions.  While “click-wrap” contracts are 
structurally similar to conventional non-electronic contracts, the method of 
contracting still raises some concerns.  It is common with that sort of contracting for 
the terms of the agreement to be relatively lengthy, while being shown in a small 
screen box, which requires one to “scroll down” to read all of the terms given.  Thus, 
“click-wrap” contracts are often like standard-form contracts in a slightly new 
setting.  Standard-form contracting in general raises issues regarding fairness and 
                                                                
7See, e.g., ProCD, Inc. v. Zeidenberg, 86 F.3d 1447 (7th Cir. 1996); Hill v. Gateway 2000, 
Inc., 105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997). But cf. Step-Saver Data Sys., Inc. v. Wyse Tech., 939 F.2d 
91 (3d Cir. 1991) (shrinkwrap terms treated as suggested terms additional to existing contract, 
and excluded under U.C.C. § 2-207); Softman Prods. Co. v. Adobe Sys., Inc., 171 F. Supp. 2d 
1075 (C.D. Cal. 2001) (shrinkwrap terms on software not assented to where defendant had not 
loaded the software). 
8While it seems relatively clear as a matter of doctrine in rolling contract situations that 
items can be returned if purchasers object to terms shortly after those terms are brought to 
their attention, there is some evidence that the commercial reality might be more complicated.  
Retailers may resist consumers returning computers after the box has already been opened 
(and generally the only way the consumers can see all the terms being applied to them is by 
opening the box).  For example, under the policy of the prominent electronics chain store, Best 
Buy, opened software may not be returned, and returned computers may be subject to a 
significant “restocking” charge.  No exception is stated for software or computers returned 
because the terms of sale or lease found with the items were not acceptable.  Best Buy.com 
Return Policy, http://www.bestbuy.com/site/olspage.jsp?type=page&id=cat12098&contentId= 
1043363607061&_requestid=27708 (last visited Apr. 2, 2006). 
9See, e.g., Carnival Cruise Lines, Inc. v. Shute, 499 U.S. 585 (1991) (enforcing forum-
selection clause that was included among three pages of terms attached to ticket for cruise).   
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assent,10 but Robert Hillman has pointed out that such problems may be exacerbated 
with electronic contracting.  The argument is that consumers may be even less likely 
to read the terms of “click-wrap” agreements than the terms of conventional 
standard-form contracts, since on-line transactions are frequently chosen because 
speed is valued, and in those circumstances consumers are less likely to stop to read 
and evaluate the fine print.11  
Electronic contracting caselaw and practice also include two salient deviations 
from the rules and practices of standard contracting. First, the way many courts have 
discounted or ignored the Uniform Commercial Code’s12 provision for “the battle of 
the forms”13 in contexts where it seems to apply;14 and second, the acceptance by 
some courts of “browsewrap” as a valid means of acceptance/contract formation. 
“Browsewrap” involves a presentation of terms on a Web site with the statement 
that some further action (continuing use of a site, downloading software, etc.) would 
be construed as acceptance, without any need of express assent.  The terms 
themselves may be displayed prominently in a way a user would be unlikely to miss, 
or the display page might merely mention, and perhaps not even in a prominent way, 
that terms can be found elsewhere on the site.  Under the rubric of conventional 
contract doctrine, the problem for such cases is that the purchaser or user has not 
done anything that could constitute an acceptance of the vendor’s terms (and 
Contract Law refuses, other than in exceptional circumstances, to treat silence and 
inaction as acceptance,15 and will usually only treat actions as implied acceptance 
where the terms are brought sufficiently to the offeree’s attention so that it is clear 
that the offeree’s actions can be fairly construed as accepting the terms16).  Courts 
have split on whether to enforce “browsewrap” terms.17 
                                                                
10See, e.g., Todd D. Rakoff, Contracts of Adhesion:  An Essay in Reconstruction, 96 
HARV. L. REV. 1173 (1983). 
11Robert A. Hillman, On-Line Boilerplate:  Would Mandatory Website Disclosure of E-
Standard Terms Backfire?, 104 MICH. L. REV. 837 (2006). 
12Article 2 of the Uniform Commercial Code (adopted as binding statutory law in all states 
other than Louisiana) governs the sale of goods.  
13U.C.C. § 2-207 (1977). 
14ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447 (refusing to apply U.C.C. § 2-207 on the [incorrect] basis that 
there was only one form involved in the transaction); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 105 F.3d 
1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (refusing to apply U.C.C. § 2-207, citing ProCD); Brower v. Gateway 
2000, Inc., 246 A.D.2d 246, 250 (N.Y App. Div. 1998) (refusing to apply U.C.C. § 2-207, on 
the basis that the contract had not yet been formed). But see Step-Saver Data Sys. v. Wyse 
Tech., 939 F.2d 91 (3d Cir. 1991) (applying U.C.C. § 2-207); Klocek v. Gateway, Inc., 104 F. 
Supp. 2d 1332 (D. Kan. 2000) (applying U.C.C. § 2-207). 
15See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 69 (1981). 
16Cf. id., § 50, cmt. a (“The acceptance must manifest assent to the same bargain proposed 
by the offer.” (emphasis added)). 
17E.g., Specht v. Netscape Communications Corp., 150 F. Supp. 2d 585 (S.D.N.Y. 2001) 
(refusing enforcement); Ticketmaster v. Tickets.com, Inc., No. 99CV7654, 2000 WL 1887522 
(C.D. Cal. Aug. 10, 2000) (concluding, for the purposes of preliminary injunction, that there is 
a possibility of a binding contract on “browsewrap” terms); Pollstar v. Gigmania, Ltd., 70 F. 
4https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss1/9
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B. Analysis 
In general, electronic contracting cases sometimes seem like good examples of 
“legal realism”:  the way that judges will manipulate the doctrine to achieve the 
outcomes they otherwise consider fair or practical.  One can see it in Judge 
Easterbrook’s unwillingness to follow UCC formation rules in ProCD v. Zeidenberg 
and Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc.;18 one can see it in the few cases where courts enforce 
browsewrap transactions19; and in many of the cases where the courts refused full 
enforcement of click-wrap transactions.20  In these cases, it seems that the courts will 
try to find a way to enforce terms if they think that non-enforcement would lead to 
unjust enrichment of a bad actor, or would cause significant inconvenience, with 
little purpose, to businesses.  As one commentator stated: “[T]he cases that approve 
RCs [rolling contracts] appear motivated by the utility and practicality of easy forms 
of contracting, and at least some approving opinions seem to fly in the face of 
doctrinal analysis.”21 It may be that the charitable way to read these developments is 
that when Contract Law overtakes new kinds of transactions it does a better job of 
taking into account countervailing considerations (here, business efficacy) than 
Property Law does – contrasting the problems with propertization shown in Prof. 
Radin’s paper.22  The less charitable way to view the developments is that both Prof. 
Radin’s paper and the U.S. cases discussed in this paper show a judiciary that tends 
to construct rules in ways favorable to business interests. 
The general level of substantive and procedural fairness within current electronic 
contracting remains uncertain and controversial.  Looking at the reported cases (and 
the media articles), one might get the impression that electronic contracting is more 
likely than other commercial transactions—or at least other consumer transactions—
to include one-sided arbitration agreements, forum selection clauses, and other 
restrictive clauses.23  That said, at least one researcher who has looked at the question 
                                                           
Supp. 2d 974 (E.D. Cal. 2000); Register.com, Inc. v. Verio, Inc.,  356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004) 
(enforcing browsewrap terms).   
18ProCD, 86 F.3d 1447 (focusing on the fact that the purchaser intended to exploit for his 
own purposes work the vendor has spent $10 million compiling); Hill v. Gateway 2000, Inc., 
105 F.3d 1147 (7th Cir. 1997) (“Practical considerations support allowing vendors to enclose 
the full legal terms with their products.”). 
19E.g., Register.com, Inc., v. Verio, Inc., 356 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2004). 
20See, e.g., Williams v. America Online, Inc., No. 00-0962, 2001 WL 135825 (Mass. 
Super.  Feb. 8, 2001) (refusing to enforce forum selection clause in clickwrap case, 
mentioning both formation questions and questions about the substantive fairness of the 
clause).  
21Clayton P. Gillette, Rolling Contracts as an Agency Problem, 2004 WIS. L. REV. 679, 
682 (2001) (footnote omitted).  Of course, the utility and practicality may be more on the 
provider’s side than the consumer’s side.  Comparison shopping of terms becomes much more 
difficult if one can only learn about terms by purchasing all the alternative items.  See Julie E. 
Cohen, Lochner in Cyberspace:  The New Economic Orthodoxy of “Rights Management,” 97 
MICH. L. REV. 462, 487 (1998). 
22See Radin, supra note 3. 
23Lucian Bebchuk and Richard Posner have recently argued that such one-sided terms are 
reasonable in a context where there is a danger that consumers might act opportunistically and 
where courts cannot perfectly observe compliance with terms.  In such circumstances, they 
5Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
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more systematically claims that, at least for some categories of electronic 
contracting, the agreements are not significantly more pro-seller than comparable 
agreements outside the category.24 
It should be noted that with some of the transactions involved in these cases the 
consumers are ignorant (and occasionally misled) regarding the basic nature of the 
transaction – in particular, that transactions involving software are frequently 
licenses for a single use, rather than a conventional sale of a good.25  This fact is 
complicated by two others:  on one hand, that the users’ reasonable expectations that 
they are entering a sale does not trump the vendor’s terms that the transaction is in 
fact a license; and, on the other hand, that the terms set by the vendor on a sale or 
license can trump the copyright law rules that would otherwise control the use of 
data in the purchased or licensed material.26   
C. Uniform Law Responses 
Efforts to aim regulation directly at electronic transactions remain at an early 
stage.  An early effort co-sponsored by American Law Institute (ALI) and the 
National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL), as the 
proposed Uniform Commercial Code Article 2B, was abandoned when the ALI 
walked out, believing that a proposal acceptable (and fair) to both suppliers and 
consumers was not obtainable.  The proposal was carried forward by NCCUSL as 
the  Uniform  Computer  Information  Transactions  Act  (UCITA),  finalized in July  
1999,27 but it was adopted by only two states, Maryland and Virginia.28  In August 
2003, NCCUSL suspended efforts to obtain state adoption.29 
                                                           
argue, it makes sense for sellers to insert one-sided terms in their form contracts, but usually to 
decline to enforce them.  Lucian A. Bebchuk & Richard A. Posner, One-Sided Contracts in 
Competitive Consumer Markets, 104 MICH. L. REV. 827 (2006). 
24See Florencia Marotta-Wurgler, Are ‘Pay Now, Terms Later’ Contracts Worse for 
Buyers?  Evidence From Software License Agreements (NYU Law and Economics Research 
Paper No. 05-10, 2005), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id= 
799274.  
25Additionally, some courts have raised questions about whether the transactions the 
vendor characterizes as a “license,” should be re-characterized as a sale (thus making Article 2 
of the Uniform Commercial Code more clearly applicable).  See, e.g., Softman Products Co., 
171 F. Supp. 2d at 1083-87. 
26See ProCD, 86 F.3d at 1453-55 (rejecting arguments based on copyright law).  
27UNIF. COMPUTER INFO. TRANSACTIONS ACT, available at http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ 
ulc/ucita/ucita200.pdf. 
28See VA. CODE ANN. §§ 59.1-501.1 to 509.2 (LexisNexis 2005); MD. CODE ANN. COM. 
LAW §§ 22-101 to 22-816 (LexisNexis 2005).  The Virginia version was modified in 2004 in 
ways that responded to concerns about consumer protection and free expression.  See 
MARGARET J. RADIN ET AL., INTERNET COMMERCE:  THE EMERGING FRAMEWORK 836 n.3 (2d 
ed. 2006). 
Additionally, at least four states (Iowa, North Carolina, West Virginia, and Vermont) have 
adopted anti-UCITA “bomb shelter” laws to prevent vendors transacting business in those 
states from “opting into” UCITA based on the states where it is in force.  See IOWA CODE 
ANN. § 554D.125 (West Supp. 2005); N.C. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 66-329 (LexisNexis 2005); VT. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 2463a (LexisNexis 2005); W. VA. CODE ANN. § 55-8-15 (LexisNexis 
2005).   
6https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss1/9
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In the meantime, the ALI has returned to the topic, with work on “Principles of 
the Law of Software Contracts” (ALI Principles).30  When UCITA emphasized 
“freedom of contract,” allowing the parties to set the terms of their transactions, 
critics argued that this in effect would allow the imposition of unfair and one-sided 
terms by sophisticated vendors against unsuspecting consumers.31  The ALI 
Principles, at least at the present stage, emphasizes primarily the advance disclosure 
of terms.32  For example, as regards transactions downloading from Internet sites, 
Section 2.01(c) states:   
A standard-form agreement … is not enforceable unless  
(1) the standard form is reasonably accessible electronically prior to the 
 immediate transaction; 
(2) the transferee can complete the transaction only by signifying  
agreement at the end of the standard form; and 
(3) the standard form is reasonably comprehensible;  
(4) the transferee can store and reproduce the standard form.33 
This would effectively negate “browsewrap” claims.  As regards “terms in the 
box” (shrink-wrap), the ALI Principles would also require significantly more from 
vendors than most of the current case-law: that any standard form be “reasonably 
accessible electronically prior to payment,” and that any retail store offer “reasonable 
access to the standard form prior to payment.”34 
D. Contrast with Europe 
As will be discussed in Part II, the European response to the issues raised by 
these new forms of contracting has turned on separating consumer transactions from 
transactions between businesses.  While there is a tradition of consumer protection 
through separate legal rules in the United States (both at the state and federal level),35 
and while some commercial rules will be different for consumers than they are for 
business-to-business transactions,36 on the whole the rules for the construction and 
enforcement of agreements is the same for both.   
                                                           
29Patrick Thibodeau, New Battle Brews Over UCITA, Software Licensing Terms: Some 
Users Worry That the Act Could Be Cited By Default in Courts, COMPUTERWORLD, July 11, 
2005. 
30See, e.g., AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF SOFTWARE CONTRACTS, 
PRELIMINARY DRAFT NO. 2 (Aug. 20, 2005) [hereinafter ALI PRELIMINARY DRAFT]. 
31Links to letters supporting UCITA against such criticisms can be found at http://www. 
nccusl.org/nccusl/ucita/UCITA_Standby_Comm.htm. 
32See ALI PRELIMINARY DRAFT, supra note 30.  
33Id. § 2.01(c). 
34Id. § 2.02(c).  There are also subsections dealing with comprehensible content and 
storage and reproduction of the form.  Id. 
35There is sufficient jurisprudence in this area to support the occasional course and 
textbook.  See, e.g., DOUGLAS J. WHALEY, PROBLEMS AND MATERIALS ON CONSUMER LAW 
(4th ed. 2006).   
36There are a number of provisions of the sales provision (Article 2) of the Uniform 
Commercial Code that apply only when both of the parties are merchants.  See, e.g., U.C.C. § 
7Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
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While there have been some suggestions in recent academic work for treating the 
two categories of agreements differently,37 there is little reason to believe that 
legislative rules or judicial decisions will move in that direction any time soon.  The 
basic assumption—belief, hope, or dogma—is that consumers, with the help of 
market pressures, are adequately able to protect their own interests;38 or, in any 
event, that efforts to help consumers would likely do them (and the businesses that 
deal with them) collectively more harm than good.39   
II. THE EU LEGAL RESPONSE 
A. Introduction:  The UCF-Que Choisir v. AOL France Case Study 
The experience of AOL in France illustrates clearly the sharp discrepancy that 
has emerged in U.S. and EU law governing consumer online contracts.  The Union 
Fédérale des Consommateurs - Que Choisir (UFC)40 brought suit against AOL 
claiming that 36 terms found in AOL’s standard form agreements violated French 
law.  In 2004, the Tribunal de Grande Instance in the Paris suburb of Nanterre found 
that 31 of the 36 terms agreements were either unfair or illegal, and therefore null 
and void under French law.41  Among the terms the trial court found unenforceable 
because they were either unfair or unlawful under French law were: 
 Providing that tacit acceptance by the subscriber of the general 
conditions would constitute acceptance; 
 Providing that the subscriber’s sole remedy in the event of breach by 
AOL is termination of the agreement; 
 Presuming that e-mail notices have been accepted 2 days after delivery; 
                                                           
2-207(b) (1977) (stating the rules for incorporating new terms in a battle of the forms when the 
agreement is “[b]etween merchants”). 
37See, e.g., Alan Schwartz & Robert E. Scott, Contract Theory and the Limits of Contract 
Law, 113 YALE L.J. 541, 543-47 (2003) (arguing for treating firm-to-firm contracts different 
from all other contracts, including consumer contracts). 
38See, e.g., Frank H. Easterbrook, Contract and Copyright, 42 HOUS. L. REV. 953, 968-70; 
(2005).  But cf. Gillette, supra note 21 (discussing how there are various mechanisms for 
ensuring the representation of buyers’ interests in the development of contract terms, though 
noting that these mechanisms are imperfect and uneven).   
39See generally Richard Craswell, Property Rules and Liability Rules in Unconscionability 
and Related Doctrines, 60 U. CHI. L. REV. 1 (1993) (discussing the disadvantages of using 
protective doctrines like unconscionability to deal with problems of unfair terms or 
insufficient information).   
40More information about the UFC is available at its website, http://www.quechoisir.org/ 
(last visited Jan. 31, 2006). 
41Tribunal de Grande Instance de Nanatarre, available at http://www.clauses-
abusives.fr/juris/tgin020604f.htm (accessed January 31, 2006); Bradley Joslove & Andréi 
Krylov, Standard American Business to Consumer Terms and Conditions in the EU, 18 MICH. 
INT’L LAWYER 2 (Spring 2005), available at http://www.michbar.org/international/pdfs/ 
spring05.pdf (last visited Apr. 11, 2006). 
8https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol54/iss1/9
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 AOL’s unilateral right to modify the agreement, payment terms and the 
subscriber’s user name at AOL’s discretion; 
 AOL’s disclaimer of all liability for service interruptions, errors and 
other failures. 
 AOL’s unilateral right to modify the agreement, even though this right 
was qualified by a duty to provide 30 days prior notice and the 
subscriber’s right to terminate the agreement within that period; and 
 AOL’s right to reasonable attorney’s fees in the event of the 
subscriber’s breach.42 
On September 15, 2005, the Court of Appeals in Versailles affirmed in full the 
decision of the Nanterre trial court.43  By contrast, any U.S. court called upon to 
review the 2003 version of the AOL France contract would likely have found it 
enforceable in full, given that AOL had not included in it any of the terms that have 
proven controversial in U.S. online consumer contracts.  While many lawyers and 
legal academics in the U.S. who study the development of online markets are aware 
of the profound differences in U.S. and EU information privacy laws,44 the 
magnitude of the divergence in recent consumer electronic contracting law 
developments is not as widely recognized.  
B. European Integration as an Engine for Consumer Contract Law Reform 
The significant differences that have emerged in recent years between consumer 
Contract Law in the EU and U.S. reflect different assumptions about the role of 
government in regulating markets, and about what legal reforms, if any, may be 
needed to achieve regulatory objectives.  In the U.S. in recent decades, the 
skepticism regarding the efficacy of government regulation has been growing at the 
same time that enthusiasm for market-driven institutional arrangements has 
increased.  Outside the U.S., however, the notion that unmediated market forces 
should play a greater role in the relationship between merchants and consumers has 
not been embraced so eagerly.  Based on the number of times they have enacted 
major new consumer protection laws in recent years, EU legislators appear to believe 
that market failures are more likely to occur in consumer markets than do their 
counterparts in the U.S.45 The EU approach to the role of the state in managing risk 
                                                                
42Joslove & Krylov, supra note 41, at 2-3. 
43Cour d’appeal [CA] [regional court of appeal] Versailles, 1e ch., Sept. 15, 2005, J.C.P. 
IV 150905, available at http://www.clauses-abusives.fr/juris/cav150905f.htm (accessed 
January 31, 2006); see also Bradley Joslove, French Appeals Court Upholds Decision Calling 
AOL’s Contract Terms Unfair, 10 ELECTRONIC COMMERCE & LAW REP. 1137 (November 23, 
2005). 
44See, e.g., DOROTHEE HEISENBERG, NEGOTIATING PRIVACY: THE EUROPEAN UNION, THE 
UNITED STATES, AND PERSONAL DATA PROTECTION (2005). 
45A complete description of recent consumer protection legislation passed in the EU can 
be found on the Directorate General for Health and Consumer Affairs website for consumer 
affairs issues at http://www.europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/index_en.htm (last visited Mar. 
25, 2006), 
9Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2006
184 CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW [Vol. 54:175 
in consumer markets is closer to the approaches taken in Canada,46 Australia,47 New 
Zealand,48 Japan49 and other developed economies50 than the U.S. approach, which 
expects ordinary consumers to navigate consumer markets with much less support.  
EU regulators and their counterparts in other developed countries also appear quite 
confident that the benefits of having regulators dictate what are permissible contract 
terms outweigh the costs.  Popular sentiment in the U.S., by contrast, appears more 
skeptical both about the frequency of market failures and whether the likely benefits 
outweigh the costs when the costs of unintended negative consequences of regulatory 
intervention are taken into account.   
For whatever reason, there appears to be a large gap in attitudes about the risk of 
regulation on the one hand, and the risk of unfettered free enterprise on the other.  
Courts and regulators in the U.S. are generally deferential to private initiative and 
innovations in marketing.  By contrast, EU regulators presume that EU consumers 
will avoid new markets unless they can be shown to be as highly regulated as 
traditional markets, and that new regulations are required to raise new distribution 
channels to meet the high levels of consumer protection provided through established 
channels. 
C. The Need for European Harmonization 
In Europe, a large body of consumer protection law has been developed to 
overcome barriers to the integration of the European markets and to promote fair and 
vigorous competition in consumer markets.  Analysis of the impact of technological 
innovation on contract behavior under EU law is only one element of this larger push 
to strengthen and harmonize consumer protection law throughout Europe.  The 
Single European Act of 1986 and the push to complete the internal market by 1992 
were strongly oriented toward liberalization and strengthening of market 
mechanisms.  Several important pieces of consumer protection legislation were 
passed as part of the move to a single market, including Directives regulating 
doorstep selling,51 consumer credit,52 and package travel.53  In 1997, the European 
                                                                
46See, e.g., Canada, Industry Canada, Internet Sales Contract Harmonization Template 
(Ottawa: Industry Canada, 2001), available at http://strategis.ic.gc.ca/epic/internet/inoca-
bc.nsf/en/ca01642e.html. 
47See, e.g., Australia Trade Practices Act 1974, available at http://scaleplus.law.gov.au/ 
html/pasteact/0/115/top.htm. 
48New Zealand, Model Code for Consumer Protection in Electronic Commerce (New 
Zealand, Ministry of Consumer Affairs, 2000), available at http://www.consumeraffairs.govt. 
nz/policyandlaw/discussionpapers/model-code.html. 
49See, e.g., Consumer Contract Act 2001, available at http://www.lrz-muenchen.de/~ 
Lorenz/material/ccactjp.htm. 
50See, e.g., Singapore Unfair Contract Terms Act, (1994) Cap. 396, available at 
http://statutes.agc.gov.sg/. 
51Council Directive 85/577/EEC of 20 December 1985 to protect the Consumer in respect 
of contracts negotiated away from business premises, available at http://europa.eu.int/eur-
lex/lex/LexUriServ/LexUriServ.do?uri=CELEX:31985L0577:EN:html. 
52Council Directive 87/102/EEC of 22 December 1986 for the approximation of the laws, 
regulations and administrative provisions of the Member States concerning consumer credit, 
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Commission announced its intention to create a coherent legal framework within 
Europe for electronic commerce by the year 2000.54  Although in recent years, the 
volume of new EU consumer protection legislation has slowed, it has not abated 
altogether.  For example, in 2005, the EU passed the Unfair Commercial Practices 
Directive, harmonizing and updating the law of unfair and deceptive trade practices 
in member states.55 
EU law defining who can be a consumer, and the standards of behavior that can 
be expected of consumers differ significantly from U.S. law.  Under U.S. law, a 
consumer transaction is commonly defined as one undertaken by a natural person for 
goods or services for personal, family or household use.56  By contrast, most 
European countries define a consumer as someone acting outside his or her trade or 
profession, so a merchant may be covered if acting outside his or her specialized 
trade or profession.57  However, the European Court of Justice has set limits on the 
ability of merchants in some countries to use technical requirements of consumer 
protection law to invalidate contracts with other merchants on the grounds that a 
consumer protection law was violated.58  
D. EU Consumer Electronic Contract Law Reforms 
Some of the most significant differences between the EU and U.S. consumer 
Contract Law applicable to online transactions are attributable to the Unfair Contract 
Terms Directive, which regulates form contracts offered by merchants to consumers 
whether online or offline; the Distance Selling Directive, which regulates 
transactions between remote merchants and consumers, whether by means of 
television, telemarketing, Internet or other electronic communications medium; and 
the Electronic Commerce Directive, which promotes transparency and accountability 
in online commerce.  Because as a general rule, EU Directives do not affect the 
rights and obligations of individuals until the Directive has been transposed into 
national law, it is hard to form an accurate impression of the impact of Directives on 
individual rights and obligations until the corresponding national legislation has been 
                                                           
available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod!CELEXnumdoc 
&lg=EN&numdoc=31987L0102&model=guichett. 
53Council Directive 90/314/EEC of 12 June 1990 on package travel, package holidays and 
package tours, available at http://europa.eu.int/smartapi/cgi/sga_doc?smartapi!celexapi!prod! 
CELEXnumdoc&lg=EN&numdoc=31990L0314&model=guichett. 
54A European Initiative on Electronic Commerce, COM(97) 157 final, 16.6.1997, 
available at http://europa.eu.int/scadplus/leg/en/lvb/l32101.htm. 
55Guiseppe Abbamonte, The Unfair Commercial Practices Directive: An Example of the 
New European Consumer Protection Approach (unpublished manuscript, on file with 
authors).   
56See 15 U.S.C. § 1602(h) (2005) (Truth in Lending).   
57See, e.g., Brussels Convention 13(1) (contract concluded by a person who can be 
regarded as outside his trade or profession); Société Bertrand v. Paul Ott KG, [1978] ECR 
1431, Bertrand C-150/77. 
58See Di Pinto C-361/89 Criminal Proceedings v. Patrice di Pinto, [1991] ECR I-1189, 
Bayerische Hypotheken- und Wechselbank C-45/96 Bayerische Hypotheken- und 
Wechselbank AG v. Edgar Dietzinger, [1998] ECR I-1199. 
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considered.59  Given that it is beyond the scope of this paper to give a detailed 
account of European national consumer protection laws, the following analysis will 
focus on examples from the United Kingdom to illustrate the general character of 
national law in this area.  
1. Unfair Contract Terms Directive 
Several European countries had enacted laws regulating “unfair” terms in 
standard form contracts used in consumer transactions.  For example, in 1977, the 
UK had enacted the Unfair Contract Terms Act which limited the enforcement of 
“exemption clauses” (which might be referred to as disclaimers under U.S. law) to 
the extent they were not “reasonable.”  As a result, the Directorate General (DG) for 
Health and Consumer Affairs developed a Directive that would harmonize unfair 
contract terms laws, which was enacted in 1993.60  The fundamental premise of 
unfair contract terms laws is that general Contract Law is not adequate to protect 
consumers from overreaching by merchants, and that the contours of “unfairness” 
can be spelled out without too much difficulty.  The regulation of unfair contract 
terms establishes a much lower threshold for intervention by courts and regulators 
than the concept of unconscionabilty under U.S. Contract Law, or federal and state 
regulation of unfair and deceptive trade practices.  The Directive provides that 
contract terms not individually negotiated will be deemed unfair if they create a 
significant imbalance, to the consumer’s detriment, between the rights and 
obligations of the contracting parties.61  If a contract term is drafted in advance and 
the consumer has no influence over the substance of the term, then it is always 
considered not to be individually negotiated, and hence subject to review based on 
substantive fairness.62  An annex to the Directive contains a list of terms that may be 
deemed unfair.63  
                                                                
59There are limited exceptions.  See, e.g., Van Duyn v. Home Office 41/74, [1974] ECR 
1337 (ECJ held that only Directives that establish clear and unconditional legal norms and do 
not leave normative discretion to the member states are of direct effect; however, direct effects 
are normally effective against governments, not private parties); C-106/89 Marleasing SA v. 
La Commercial Internacionale de Alimentacion SA [1990], ECR I-4135 (national law must be 
interpreted in light of Directives even if they have not yet been transposed into national law). 
60Council Directive 93/13/EEC of 5 April 1993 on Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts, 
1993 O.J. (L 95) 29.  Member States were expected to pass laws implementing its provisions 
by the end of 1994. Id. art. 10, § 1. 
61Id.  art. 3, § 1. 
62 Id.  art. 3, § 2. 
63The terms listed in the annex include: 
(a) excluding or limiting the legal liability of a seller or supplier in the event of the 
death of a consumer or personal injury to the latter resulting from an act or omission 
of that seller or supplier;  
(b) inappropriately excluding or limiting the legal rights of the consumer vis-à-vis the 
seller or supplier or another party in the event of total or partial non-performance or 
inadequate performance by the seller or supplier of any of the contractual obligations, 
including the option of offsetting a debt owed to the seller or supplier against any 
claim which the consumer may have against him;  
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The nature of the goods or services covered by the contract, the circumstances 
surrounding the drawing up of the contract, and the other terms in the contract or in 
another contract to which it relates will be taken into account in assessing the 
unfairness of a term.64 Contract terms offered to consumers in writing must always 
be drafted in plain language and where there is doubt as to the meaning of a term, the 
                                                           
(c) making an agreement binding on the consumer whereas provision of services by 
the seller or supplier is subject to a condition whose realization depends on his own 
will alone;  
(d) permitting the seller or supplier to retain sums paid by the consumer where the 
latter decides not to conclude or perform the contract, without providing for the 
consumer to receive compensation of an equivalent amount from the seller or supplier 
where the latter is the party cancelling the contract;  
(e) requiring any consumer who fails to fulfil his obligation to pay a disproportionately 
high sum in compensation;  
(f ) authorizing the seller or supplier to dissolve the contract on a discretionary basis 
where the same facility is not granted to the consumer, or permitting the seller or 
supplier to retain the sums paid for services not yet supplied by him where it is the 
seller or supplier himself who dissolves the contract;  
(g) enabling the seller or supplier to terminate a contract of indeterminate duration 
without reasonable notice except where there are serious grounds for doing so;  
(h) automatically extending a contract of fixed duration where the consumer does not 
indicate otherwise, when the deadline fixed for the consumer to express this desire not 
to extend the contract is unreasonably early;  
(i) irrevocably binding the consumer to terms with which he had no real opportunity of 
becoming acquainted before the conclusion of the contract;  
( j) enabling the seller or supplier to alter the terms of the contract unilaterally without 
a valid reason which is specified in the contract;  
(k) enabling the seller or supplier to alter unilaterally without a valid reason any 
characteristics of the product or service to be provided;  
(l) providing for the price of goods to be determined at the time of delivery or 
allowing a seller of goods or supplier of services to increase their price without in both 
cases giving the consumer the corresponding right to cancel the contract if the final 
price is too high in relation to the price agreed when the contract was concluded;  
(m) giving the seller or supplier the right to determine whether the goods or services 
supplied are in conformity with the contract, or giving him the exclusive right to 
interpret any term of the contract;  
(n) limiting the seller’s or supplier’s obligation to respect commitments undertaken by 
his agents or making his commitments subject to compliance with a particular 
formality;  
(o) obliging the consumer to fulfill all his obligations where the seller or supplier does 
not perform his;  
(p) giving the seller or supplier the possibility of transferring his rights and obligations 
under the contract, where this may serve to reduce the guarantees for the consumer, 
without the latter’s agreement;  
(q) excluding or hindering the consumer’s right to take legal action or exercise any 
other legal remedy, particularly by requiring the consumer to take disputes exclusively 
to arbitration not covered by legal provisions, unduly restricting the evidence available 
to him or imposing on him a burden of proof which, according to the applicable law, 
should lie with another party to the contract. 
Id. Annex. 
64Id. art. 4, § 1. 
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interpretation most favorable to the consumer will prevail.65  In the event terms in a 
consumer contract are found to be unfair, those terms will not be binding on 
consumers, although the remainder of the contract will be enforceable.66 
The successful UFC suit against AOL is based on French Unfair Contract Law.  
While French Unfair Contract Terms Law may be among the most stringent in 
Europe, it is hardly unrepresentative of the current state of consumer protection law 
that would be applied to online contracts involving a U.S. merchant and an EU 
consumer.  Even England, which is generally more supportive of market-oriented 
business regulation and competition than France, has a very strong and well 
established Unfair Contract Terms Law.   The Unfair Contract Terms Act of 1977 
(UCTA) has been supplemented by the Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts 
Regulations 1999 (UTCCR) which are based on the Unfair Contract Terms 
Directive.67  The UK Office of Fair Trading provides extensive guidance to 
merchants regarding the application of the UTCA and the UTCCR by publishing 
interpretations of specific contract terms and explaining why they are either invalid 
or withstand scrutiny.68 
2. Distance Selling Directive 
In 1997, the EU adopted the Distance Selling Directive (“DS Directive”).69 The 
DS Directive is supposed to promote online commerce by providing consumers with 
the guarantee that they will be protected by their own national consumer-protection 
regime when they enter into distance-selling contracts.  “Distance selling” is defined 
as the conclusion of a contract regarding goods or services whereby the contract 
between the consumer and the supplier takes place by means of technology for 
communication at a distance. 70  The rights granted consumers through the enactment 
of the DS Directive’s provisions into national law may not be waived by the 
consumer.71  Some provisions of the DS Directive are similar to the provisions of the 
FTC Mail Order Rule,72 which requires that a transaction be completed within thirty 
days or notice of the situation be sent to the consumer and the consumer given the 
option to cancel the transaction.73 
                                                                
65Id. art. 5. 
66Id. art. 6, § 1. 
67Unfair Terms in Consumer Contracts Regulations, 1999, SI 1999/2083.  See generally 
RICHARD LAWSON, EXCLUSION CLAUSES AND UNFAIR CONTRACT TERMS (6th ed. 2000). 
68The UK OFT unfair contract terms guidance is available on its website at http://www. 
oft.gov.uk/Business/Legal/UTCC/guidance.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2006). 
69Directive 97/7/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 20 May 1997 on the 
Protection of Consumers in Respect of Distance Contracts, 1997 O.J. (L 144) 19 [hereinafter 
Council Directive 97/7/EC].  The Member States had until May 20, 2000 to enact national 
laws embodying the terms of the DS Directive. Id. art. 15. 
70Id. art. 2. 
71Id. art. 12, § 1. 
7216 C.F.R. § 435.1 (2005). 
73Council Directive 97/7/EC, supra note 69, art. 7. 
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The DS Directive covers most forms of direct marketing, including catalog mail 
order, telephone sales, direct-response television sales, newspapers, magazines, and 
electronic communications such as e-mail.  The DS Directive requires that a 
consumer be given certain minimum information both at the time of contract 
solicitation and at or before the time of delivery.74  Written confirmation must be 
received by the consumer in some form of durable medium accessible to the 
consumer.75  Consumers must be given a “cooling-off” period of at least seven 
working days, subject to certain exceptions.76  Where the consumer exercises his or 
her right of withdrawal from the contract, the supplier is obliged to reimburse the 
consumer for any sums paid.  Cold-calling of consumers by telephone, fax, or e-mail 
is not permitted unless the consumer has consented.77 
In an effort to protect merchants from unreasonable burdens in consumer 
transactions, some types of transactions are exempt from the coverage of certain DS 
Directive protections.78  For example, unless the parties have otherwise agreed, the 
consumer’s seven-day right of withdrawal does not apply to contracts for the 
provision of services if performance has begun before the seven days are up; for the 
supply of goods or services whose price depends on fluctuations in the financial 
market that cannot be controlled by the supplier; for the supply of goods made to the 
consumer’s specifications or clearly personalized, or which are likely to deteriorate 
or expire rapidly; for audio or video recordings or computer software which were 
unsealed by the consumer; for the supply of newspapers, periodicals, or magazines; 
or for gaming or lottery services. 
In the UK, the Directive was transposed into national law as the Consumer 
Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations 2000,79 which were updated by the 
Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) (Amendments) Regulations 2005.80  The UK 
Office of Fair Trading and Office of Trade and Industry each provide merchants with 
guidance regarding their distance selling obligations on their respective Websites.81 
One of the provisions of the Distance Selling Regulations most at odds with current 
U.S. law is the requirements that merchants provide complete disclosure regarding 
the terms of the contract to consumers prior to the formation of the contract.82  
                                                                
74Id. art. 4. 
75Id. art. 5. 
76Id. art. 6. 
77Id. art. 10. 
78Id. art. 6, § 3. 
79Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) Regulations, 2000, S.I. 2000/2334, (U.K.). 
80Consumer Protection (Distance Selling) (Amendment) Regulations, 2005, S.I. 2005/689, 
(U.K.). 
81Office of Fair Trading, Distance Selling Regulations, http://www.oft.gov.uk/Business/ 
Legal/DSR/default.htm (last visited Mar. 29, 2006); Department of Trade and Industry, 
Distance Sellings Regulations & E-Commerce, http://www.dti.gov.uk/ccp/topics1/ecomm.htm 
(last visited Mar. 29, 2006). 
82S.I. 2000/2334 § 7.  The Electronic Commerce Directive also makes certain disclosures 
mandatory in online contracting.  Directive 2000/31/EC of the European Parliament and 
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Furthermore, the information must be provided to the consumer in writing or another 
durable medium accessible to the consumer.83  If the merchant has provided the 
consumer with the required disclosures in writing before the contract was formed, or 
at the latest, at the time of delivery, then the consumer’s unconditional right to cancel 
an order must be exercised within seven days of receipt of the goods purchased.84  If 
the disclosures are not provided pre-contract or at delivery, but no later than three 
months after delivery, then the consumer’s right to cancel the order may be exercised 
until seven days after receipt of the written disclosures.85  The consumer is 
responsible for paying the shipping costs to return the goods only if the merchant 
clearly disclosed that term to the consumer in the written pre-contract disclosures; if 
the merchant is silent with regard to responsibility for shipping charges, then the 
consumer merely has to make the goods available for the merchant to collect and is 
not responsible for returning them.86 
CONCLUSION 
In her article, Prof. Radin showed how things can go badly—and have gone 
badly—when new areas get “propertized.”87  Our article has explored the contrasting 
ways in which the United States and the European Union have responded to Contract 
Law’s extension to new kinds of transactions.  The U.S. legal system has tried, at 
times awkwardly, to fit the new transactions into existing doctrinal categories, 
leaving protection of consumers primarily to market mechanisms.  The EU has 
similarly responded to new transactions much as they have to conventional contracts, 
but this has involved greater governmental intervention in consumer transactions, 
expressing requiring some terms while prohibiting others.  As the new types of 
contracting develop, real-world results will teach us which approach has been the 
more successful.   
 
                                                           
Council Directive of June 8, 2000 on Certain Legal Aspects of Information Society Services, 
in particular, Electronic Commerce in the Internal Market, 2000 O.J. (L 178) 1. 
83S.I. 2000/2334 § 8.   
84S.I. 2000/2334 § 12.   
85Id. 
86S.I. 2000/2334 § 17.   
87See Radin, supra note 3. 
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